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Abstract 
A table of 95% confidence limits on the probabilities for randomly downloading relatively small 
numbers of illegal images or sensitive documents amongst a relatively large number of other 
images or documents has been computed. It is anticipated that these data will assist prosecution 
officials in arriving at a decision as to whether or not there is a reasonable likelihood of a 
successful criminal prosecution when the inadvertent download defence is employed in cases of 
possession of child pornography, terrorist material or espionage related documents. The same 
data can also be used by defence counsels to assess the strength of the prosecution’s case. 
Keywords: probability theory; confidence interval; binomial distribution, inadvertent download 
defence; possession of child pornography; counter terrorism; counter espionage. 
 
Introduction and Motivation 
Prosecutions for the possession of illegally downloaded digital material have caused serious 
problems for both digital forensic examiners and prosecution authorities alike for well over a 
decade. In previous studies based upon complexity theory (Overill et al. 2010, 2011, 2012a, 
2012b, 2013a) the plausibility of the Trojan Horse Defence (THD) (George 2004, Brenner et al. 
2004, Carney & Rogers 2004, Haagman & Ghavalas 2005, Ghavalas & Philips 2005) has been 
analysed. This defence has been successfully employed against prosecutions for the possession 
of large quantities child pornography (CP) images (Chow et al. 2007, Law et al. 2011), but it also 
applies to images of terrorist material or espionage related documents. 
In this paper we address another commonly offered defence against the possession of CP 
images or the illicit possession of other documents, when only a small proportion of the 
recovered downloaded material is illegal. One typical real-world example is the recovery of a 
relatively small number of CP images distributed amongst a much larger number of adult 
pornography (AP) or other non-CP images. In such a situation, the defence might claim that the 
defendant only intended to download the non-CP images, but because the website also 
happened to contain some CP images intermixed with the non-CP images, a few of the CP 
images were accidentally or unintentionally downloaded along with the intended non-CP images. 
This has been termed the Inadvertent Download Defence (IDD) (Overill et al. 2013b) and it has 
become a cause for serious concern amongst law enforcement and prosecution authorities in 
Hong Kong, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere, due to the difficulty of establishing intentionality 
beyond reasonable doubt in such cases. 
What credence can be given to a defence such as this? More specifically, what proportion of CP 
images needs to be present in the download in order for the prosecution to arrive at an 
assessment that there is a reasonable chance of securing a conviction by refuting the IDD, 
ceteris paribus? Put colloquially, “once is accidental, twice is coincidental, but more than twice is 
intentional”. In the present paper we attempt to address these questions by means of 
conventional probability theory applied to a downloading scenario which has been generalised 
from two recent criminal cases in the Hong Kong SAR of the PRC. A number of simplifying but 
not unrealistic assumptions regarding the browsing behaviour and the downloading context of 
the suspect have been employed as outlined below. 
 
Methodological Approach 
Let the number of distinct downloaded CP images be nc, and the number of distinct downloaded 
AP or other non-CP images be na. Thus the total number of distinct downloaded images 
recovered is nd = nc + na.  
Since the precise contents of extraterritorial and potentially dark web hosted websites from which 
the downloads was made cannot in general be investigated by local law enforcement officers, it 
is necessary to use random sampling theory to relate the proportion of CP images in the 
download to the proportion of CP images in the website as a whole. That is, for randomly 
selected images, the download contents are a representative sample of the website contents 
within some confidence interval that reflects the sampling error.  This scenario is analogous to 
the classical problem described by Jacob Bernoulli of sampling a sequence of nd balls each of 
which may be either black or white from an opaque urn containing an exceedingly large number 
of such balls, without replacing them (Johnson & Kotz 1977). The present context with non-
replaced balls of just two colours entails the application of the binomial distribution, provided that 
the total number of balls in the urn is exceedingly large. By the law of large numbers (LLN) the 
proportions in the sample converge on the proportions in the population as nd →∞, at a rate 
proportional to nd
-1 using the Markov concentration inequality (Mitzenmacher & Upfal 2005). 
Provided that the population size is so exceedingly large as to be effectively infinite then as the 
sample size approaches the population size, the proportions in the sample approach the 
proportions in the population asymptotically; larger sample sizes yield smaller sampling errors.  
(Clopper & Pearson 1934), itself based on earlier work (Fisher 1930, 1932, 1933), indicates how 
a numerical estimate of the confidence limits of a binomial distribution may be obtained from 
linear interpolation in tables of cumulative binomial terms. However, for the present application 
we proceed analytically, then numerically, as follows. 
For a specified confidence level α, we wish to calculate the probability bounds that precisely nc 
distinct CP images are present amongst the nd distinct downloaded (sampled) images. For this 
purpose we assume that the website to be organised in such a way that any CP images are 
distributed randomly amongst the non-CP images (rather than in a special section, for example), 
so that the website owner could plausibly deny all knowledge of the presence of any CP images 
on their website. We consequently assume that the defendant encountered the CP images 
randomly whilst browsing the website contents and selected the image thumbnails for 
downloading as an integral part of their browsing activities. 
Within the context of the model outlined above, the (unknown) number N of distinct images 
available for downloading from the website is considered to be so exceedingly large as to be 
effectively infinite, so that the probability of selecting either a CP image or a non-CP image 
remains essentially unchanged as the downloading (sampling) process proceeds. We term this 
the ‘infinite scenario’. Websites containing a (known) finite number of downloadable images N 
can also be modelled parametrically in a corresponding ‘finite scenario’ and as N̑→∞ the ‘finite’ 
scenario approaches the ‘infinite’ scenario asymptotically (Overill et al. 2013b). 
Since the observed probabilities of selecting a CP image and a non-CP image both remain 
sensibly constant at p̑ = (nc /nd) and q̑ = (na /nd) = (1 – p̑) respectively, the binomial theorem can 
be applied directly, and the probability of selecting a CP image lies in the interval p1 < p < p2 with 
some confidence level α. 
In order to determine the confidence interval for p̑, it is necessary to integrate the corresponding 
binomial term such that: 
∫ (
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objects; it is to be understood that the confidence interval is centrally located in the range [0, 1] 
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-1 to the overall normalization of the 
binomial distribution. 
Integrating by parts repeatedly and solving the resulting recurrence relations yields: 
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In order to determine the values of p1 and p2 that satisfy the specified confidence level α, the 
Method of Bisection or Regula Falsi (Pizer 1975) can be used to optimize p1 in the 
monotonically increasing interval [0, p̑] and similarly to optimize p2 in the monotonically 
decreasing interval [p̑, 1]. The confidence interval for the sampled proportion p̑ is then 
expressed as the confidence interval [min(P1, P2), P̂] for the unimodal probability P that 
precisely nc distinct CP images are present amongst the nd downloaded (sampled) images 
From a computational perspective, intermediate numerical values of exceedingly large 
(>>10+300) and exceedingly small (˂˂10-300) magnitudes inevitably occur during the computation 
of the probabilities for real-world scenarios, and these were handled by employing adaptive 
numerical scaling techniques to avoid overflow and underflow exceptions. The numerical 
stability of the probabilities obtained was also verified by performing each probability calculation 
in three distinct ways: namely, by computing the required products in ascending order, in 
reverse order, and in symmetric pairwise fashion. 
 
Evaluation and Interpretation 
In order to make this model straightforward to use by law enforcement officers and legal 
counsel involved in actual criminal prosecution and defence cases, a table of the 95% 
confidence limits on P̂ corresponding to a range of typical values for both nc and nd has been 
computed and can be found as Table 1. The values are rounded to 4 decimal places (i.e. to 
0.01%). Within an adversarial legal system the lower confidence limit represents the ‘best case’ 
result for the prosecution side and the ‘worst case’ result for the defence side; mutatis mutandis, 
the upper confidence limit represents the ‘worst case’ result for the prosecution side and the 
‘best case’ result for the defence side Thus both legal teams can obtain a quantitative indication 
of the probative value or plausibility of their respective cases from these data. To be explicit 
regarding the relationship between plausibility and probability, probabilities signify the quantities 
that define a particular monotonic scale on which degrees of plausibility can conveniently be 
measured (Jaynes 1995). We note that the confidence intervals for the sampled proportion p̑ 
computed by the present approach are significantly tighter than those produced by the ‘exact’ 
Clopper–Pearson approach utilising Β (Beta) or F (Fisher) distributions which are conservative 
in the sense that they are always greater than or equal to the true confidence interval; for 
example, the width of the confidence interval for p̑ in the case nd=10, nc=1 is just 88% of the 
width of the corresponding Clopper–Pearson confidence interval (e.g. Pezzullo 2007). 
We now present two illustrative examples in which the methodology described above can be 
applied to the evaluative assessment of the plausibility of the IDD; the data are derived from two 
actual criminal cases from the Hong Kong SAR of the PRC (Overill et al. 2013b).  
Case 1: In District Court Criminal Case No. 968/2010, the defendant had over 30,000 image 
files which he had downloaded on various occasions. Amongst them, there were 63 still images 
and 185 video clips, all 248 of which image files were of CP. The remainder were indecent and 
obscene materials, plus cartoons and comic story books. Here, nc = 248 and nd = 30,000; we 
calculate that the 95% confidence interval lies between 0.0254 and 0.0029. That is, we can say 
with 95% confidence that there is a chance of no more than 2½% that the recovered download 
was the result of the oblivious random browsing activity typified by the IDD. 
Case 2: In District Court Criminal Case No. 32/2013, the defendant had 714,430 image files 
(including still images and video clips) which he had downloaded on various occasions. 
Amongst them, there were 84 video clips which were of CP. The remainder were indecent and 
obscene materials. Here, nc = 84 and nd = 714,430; we calculate that the upper 95% confidence 
limit lies at 0.0435. That is, we can say with 95% confidence that there is a chance of less than 
4½% that the recovered download was the result of inadvertent random browsing activity. 
In the light of our earlier discussion of the convergence behaviour of the sampling error, it is 
worth remarking that our results demonstrate the expected tightening of the 95% confidence 
interval bounds with increasing sample size. It should also be mentioned that a single trivial 
modification to the software enables the computation to be carried out at any other confidence 
level (e.g., 99%) 
The Role of Digital Forensic Metadata 
It is important to emphasise the vital role that digital forensic metadata play in interpreting the 
confidence limits in Table 1. In both of the actual criminal cases cited above, the image files 
were in fact downloaded over a substantial period of time, involving a number of separate 
downloading sessions accessing more than one website. Careful analysis of the creation, last 
modification and last access time and date stamps of the downloaded files is capable of 
revealing whether all the illicit files were downloaded during one session or from a single 
website, or whether their downloading was distributed across many sessions and/or websites. 
By focussing only on those sessions during which illicit files were downloaded, a different 
perspective on the defendant’s downloading behaviour may emerge which may in turn require a 
revision of the sampled proportion and its confidence limits. 
A second important role for digital forensic metadata is to provide answers to vital questions 
such as the following: is there evidence that each or any of the illicitly downloaded files was in 
fact accessed, copied or viewed? If analysis of the creation, last modification and last access 
time and date stamps of the downloaded files indicates that none of these activities actually 
took place then the defendant may be in a position to credibly assert that they were unaware 
not only of the contents of these files, but also of their very existence. This would greatly 
weaken the prosecution’s case in establishing the mens rea (‘guilty mind’) of the defendant with 
regard to possession of the material. 
It is now common for consumers of illicit materials to use ‘in private’ browsing in order to 
minimise the amount of web related metadata (cookies, browsing history, etc.) to be found on 
their client machines. In addition, use of Tor and similar browsers results in minimal useful 
metadata at their ISP and beyond into the dark web. It is therefore essential to extract the 
maximum possible information from the metadata mentioned above in order to understand as 
fully as possible the modus operandi of the suspect with regard to how the downloaded material 
was treated. Nevertheless, in some cases less cautious suspects will leave ample traces of their 
browsing and downloading activities, even including online search terms; however, the majority 
of suspects, if they use online search terms at all, will employ covert (rather than overt) search 
terms in order to obfuscate their true intentions and render it more difficult to make use of as 
convincing evidence in a court of law. 
A final issue which digital forensic analysis is only beginning to address relates specifically to 
cases of suspected possession of CP images: is the subject of each of the images clearly 
identifiable as a minor (i.e. less than 16 years of age)? For subjects close in age below this 
boundary, defendants may attempt to credibly assert (perhaps on the basis of a low resolution 
thumbnail image) that they reasonably believed the subject of the image in question to be 
legally an adult. Despite substantial technical advances, current digital facial aging software 
(Prat et al. 2013) and human skin tone/texture recognition software (de Castro Polastro et al. 
2012, Steel 2012) are not yet sufficiently reliable for this purpose, which means that for the time 
being the distressing task of ‘eyeballing’ suspected CP images must continue to be carried out 
by human inspection.  
Conclusions 
A table has been computed of the 95% confidence limits on the probabilities P for the 
downloading small numbers of illicit files amongst a proportionately much greater number of 
non-illicit files, under the assumptions of random illicit file distribution, browsing and 
downloading. One purpose of the tabulated data is to assist both prosecution authority officials 
and also defence counsels in evaluating the plausibility of the inadvertent download defence 
(IDD) which may be raised in cases where the proportion of illicit files in the download is small. 
As such, it is intended to aid officials of the prosecution authority in coming to an informed 
decision as to whether there is a realistic prospect of a successful criminal prosecution in any 
particular case, ceteris paribus. At the same time, however, it is also a tool that the defence side 
can employ in arriving at a view on the likely effectiveness of running the IDD in any particular 
case. The potential applications to criminal cases involving not only possession of CP images 
but also counter terrorism and counter espionage scenarios have also been outlined. Last, but 
by no means least, the importance of using digital forensic metadata to provide solid, reliable 
supporting evidence in such cases has been emphasised. 
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Table 1 ― 95% confidence limits on the probability P̂ for the inadvertent random downloading of nc illicit 
images amongst nd images within the IDD model. 
  
nd  \  nc 1 10 100 1,000 10,000 100,000 
1 ― ― ― ― ― ― 
10 .0343―.3874 ― ― ― ― ― 
100 .0224―.3697 .0145―.1319 ― ― ― ― 
1,000 .0244―.3681 .0127―.1257 .0055―.0420 ― ― ― 
10,000 .0207―.3679 .0131―.1252 .0056―.0401 .0019―.0133 ― ― 
100,000 .0149―.3679 .0131―.1251 .0039―.0399 .0019―.0127 .0006―.0042 ― 
1,000,000 .0149―.3679 .0131―.1251 .0039―.0399 .0019―.0126 .0005―.0040 .0002―.0013 
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